

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Important items to be discussed in the Department.

1. Mediterranean Study.  
Joint Board, (Admiral Stark)
2. Defenses and developments for new bases. Atlantic.  
Underground storage, auxiliary landing fields, etc.  
Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy or  
will Army be involved?  
(Admiral Stark.)
3. Personnel increase.  
(President, after discussion with Admiral  
Stark, Admiral Nimitz.)
4. Fleet Training. Present training too elementary and  
cautious. What steps to make more advanced?  
(Admiral Stark)
5. Greater target practice, ammunition allowance  
and more drone practice. Ships with war ammu-  
nition allowance cannot carry sufficient target  
practice ammunition. Additional ammunition  
ships urgently and constantly needed.  
(Admiral Stark)
6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps  
for early procurement of fast and adequate  
numbers of auxiliaries to cover all probable  
Fleet employment?  
(Admiral Stark - Admiral Robinson)
7. Mine laying by airplanes. What is contemplated?  
(Admiral Towers - Admiral Stark)

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海軍省長官官房

ワシントン

長官宛覺書

省内議案要項

一、地中海研究。共同委員會。（スターク海軍大將）

二、新基地防備及擴張。太西洋。地下倉庫。補助着陸場。其他に關する件。  
防備に關する責任は全部海軍に屬するものなりや。或は又陸軍も分担  
するものなりや。（スターク海軍大將）

三、人員増加の件。（大統領、スターク海軍大將と討議の後。

ニミツ（元帥）

四、艦隊訓練の件。現在の訓練は極めて初步且つ慎重に過ぐ。更に高度な

らしめる方法如何。（スターク海軍大將）

五、更に大規模の標的演習、弾薬給與及び對空射擊演習（度數）増加の件。  
軍需品輸送船は標的演習用弾薬を十分輸送し得ず。追加弾薬船が緊急  
に、且、水續的に必要である。（スターク海軍大將）

六、高速度補助艦に於ける大なる缺陷

凡ゆる艦隊編成を満たすに足る數の高速度補助艦を遠かに優待するに執るべき處置如何。——（スターク海軍大將——ロビンソン海軍大將——）

七、航空機による機雷敷設の件。之に關する企圖如何。——（ダワーズ海軍大將——スターク海軍大將——）



Exhibit No. 39 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of  
the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-  
Ninth Congress, First Session. (Excerpt)

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff to the War Department Message Center by Colonel Bratton, G-2, who gave it in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11:50 a.m., December 7. It was typed in Colonel Bratton's presence and delivered to the Code Clerk. Time of recording on the Message Center records is 12 noon, December 7.

Colonel Bratton asked Colonel French at this time how long it would take before the message was on the way. Colonel French replied that it would be on the way in ten minutes and that it would be in the hands of addressees within 30 minutes at the latest. Colonel Bratton reported those facts to the Chief of Staff.

The following is the log of the message:

|  | <u>Honolulu</u> |             |
|--|-----------------|-------------|
|  | <u>E.S.T.</u>   | <u>Time</u> |
| Filed War Department Message Center-----   | 12:00 noon      | 6:30 AM     |
| Sent <u>Western Union</u> -----            | 12:17 PM        | 6:47 AM     |
| Received RCA, Honolulu-----                |                 | 7:33 AM     |
| Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu----- |                 | 11:45 AM    |
| Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department----- |                 | 2:58 PM     |

The Message Center reports that a check from Honolulu indicates that on receipt this message was handed to an oriental messenger (statement Colonel French to Colonel Smith, Secretary, General Staff) for delivery by hand to Army Headquarters.

(Signed) W.B. Smith,  
W.B. SMITH,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Secretary, General Staff.

(Pages 1409 - 1410, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

合衆國館 七九議會第一會期、眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據文書

第三九號（拔萃）

證據文書第三九號

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月十五日

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月十九日

記録用照書

添附のメツセーデは參謀總長の指令により G-1-2 (情報第二科) のプラットン大佐が個人的に陸軍省通信本部に特參したものでノ大佐はこれを十二月七日午前十一時五十分通信本部長フレン大佐に自身手交した。同メツセーデはプラットン大佐立會の下にタイブル打たれ、號電信係に引渡された。逕信本部記録に記された記録時刻は十二月七日正午である。

この際プラットン大佐はフレンチ大佐にメツセーデの發信までにはざのくらゐかかるものか尋ねたところ、フレンチ大佐は十分以内には確信され廻くも三十分以内には名宛人の手に入るこ答へた。ブ

ラットン大佐はこれらの方を參謀長に報告した  
メツセーデ記載要領左の如し

東部標準時間  
ホノルル時間

|         |        |
|---------|--------|
| 正午十二、〇〇 | 午前六、三〇 |
| 午後十二、一七 | 午前六、四七 |
| 十一、四三   | 七、三三   |

ホノルル通信將校に送達  
ハワイ聯隊區、軍務局長室送達

ホノルル通信將校に送達  
ハワイ聯隊、軍務局長室送達  
午後二、五八  
十一、四五

ホノルルからの確証によれば受信後直ちに同メツセードは直接陸軍司令部に手交する。一東洋人メツセンデマーが手渡された旨通信本部は報じてゐる（フレンチ大佐の參謀本部副官スマス大佐に對する言明による）

參謀本部副官 大佐

W.B.スミス

（「國珠」攻堅」第十四卷 二〇九一一四一〇頁）

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE  
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK - CONGRESS OF THE  
UNITED STATES, PART 34, PAGES 1168 - 1193

TELEGRAM SENT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
No Distribution

Washington  
November 27, 1941

AMEMBASSY

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

On November 20 the Japanese presented a five-point proposal for a temporary agreement in substance as follows:

One. The United States to refrain from actions prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China.

Two. Both countries to remove freezing restrictions and to restore commercial relations. The United States to furnish Japan a required amount of petroleum.

Three. Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary commodities from the Dutch East Indies.

Four. Both countries not repeat not to make any armed advancement into areas of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indochina.

Five. Japan to withdraw its troops from Indochina following either peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be made part of a final agreement.

The Department gave consideration of a number of alternate proposals and countersuggestions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government, simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given them on November 26, an alternate plan for a temporary modus vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi, both Governments would at the request of either confer to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

The draft modus vivendi which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, a small

amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated imports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the draft modus vivendi the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were consulted.

On November 25 the Chinese Ambassador at his request called on the Secretary and sought to make profuse preliminary explanations of the attitude which Chiang Kai-shek had expressed in several telegrams through several channels to several addressees in regard to the draft modus vivendi which we were considering. The Ambassador handed the Secretary a copy of a telegram from the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that the Generalissimo felt the American Government had put aside the Chinese question and QUOTE is still inclined to appease Japan UNQUOTE at China's expense. In that telegram the Foreign Minister said he had told the Generalissimo that the Secretary of State had always evidenced the greatest respect for fundamental principles, that the Secretary's inquiry regarding the possibility of a modus vivendi indicated that nothing had been as yet given to the Japanese, and the Chinese Foreign Minister went on to reassert China's firm opposition to any step increasing its difficulties or strengthening Japan's aggressive power.

The Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador that some progress was being made in conversations with the Japanese looking to broad-gauge peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific, and that the Japanese were urging that such conversations for that purpose be continued.

The Secretary pointed out that Major Chiang Kai-shek and the Generalissimo had only recently sent many vigorous long cables to Washington emphasizing the extreme danger to the Burma Road and appealing for aid. The Secretary said that one of the prime points of the draft modus vivendi which he and the President had under consideration was to protect the Burma Road from the imminent danger pointed out by Chiang Kai-shek. The Secretary said Chiang Kai-shek apparently failed to note that the draft modus vivendi would inter alia relieve the Japanese menace from Indochina to the whole south Pacific area including China and trade routes there. The Secretary pointed out that competent military opinion in this country was to the effect that the limited amount of petroleum products Japan might obtain during the ninety-day period of the draft modus-vivendi under consideration would not repeat nor appreciably augment Japan's military preparations.

After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should drop the draft modus vivendi which we had had under consideration.

The Department has informed you in separate telegrams of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 26 and of the conversation which took place on that date.

RWJ

海護側文書第一五〇〇四一五號

米國國會眞珠灣攻撃ニ關スル共同調查委員會  
審問聽取書ヨリ抜粹——

第十四號 一一八八頁一一九三頁

一九四一年十一月廿七日、華府

國務省發電信（他ニ配布セズ）

中華民國、重慶、米國大使館

大使宛密電報

十一月二十日ニ日本側ハ大略左ノ如キ五ヶ條ニ亘ル臨時協定案ヲ提出シ  
テ來タ。

一、米國ハ支那ニ對スル日本ノ平和回復努力ニ不利ナル行動ヲ執ラザルコト  
二、日米兩國トモ資產凍結ノ制限ヲ撤廢シ通商關係ヲ回復スルコト。米國ハ  
日本ニ輸シ所要ノ石油ヲ供給スルコト

三、兩國トモ蘭領印度ヨリ必需物資獲得ニ協調スルコト

四、兩國トモ、日本占領下ノ佛印ヲ除キ、東南アジア及ビ南太平洋方面ヘハ  
絶對ニ武力進駐ヲナサザル（反復ナサザル）コト

五、日支間ノ平和的解決若クハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立後速力  
ニ日本ハ佛印ヨリ撤兵スルコト、暫定措置トシテ、日本ハコノ取極メ成  
立ト共ニ其ノ兵力ヲ佛印南部ヨリ北部ニ移駐スルコト。尙コノ取極メハ  
後ニ最終的協定妥結ノ際ニハ夫ニ包含セシムルモノトス。

國務省ニ於テハ日本政府ニ提示可能ト思ハルル多クノ代案、対案、若クハ  
ソノ折衷案ヲ考究シテ見タ。一時ハ十一月二十六日ニ實際日本側ニ手交サ  
レタ提案ト同時ニ代案トシテノ暫定的ナ~~仮~~條約案ヲ提示センカトモ考ヘテ  
見タノデアル。當時考究中ノ案ニヨルト暫定的ニ三ヶ月間有效ノ~~仮~~條約ヲ  
結ビ、ソノ間ニ交渉ヲ續行シテ、全大洋洋地域ニ亘ル廣汎ナ平和的解決ジ  
見出スノ要ガアツタ。~~仮~~條約ノ有效期限滿了ニ際シテハ、兩國政府ハ孰レ  
カ一方ノ要求ニ基ツイテ協議シ所期ノ解決ニ到達ノ見込ガアツテ~~仮~~條約期  
限延長ヲ正當トスルカ否カラ決定シヤウト云フノデアル。

我方デ考究シテ居タ仮條約案ハ、平和的意圖ノ相互的誓約、東北アジア、北太平洋地域及ビ東南アジア、南太平洋地域ニ對スル武力進駐ヲナサザル者ノ相互保證、並ビニ日本側ニ於テ、佛印南部ヨリ撤兵シ、北部駐屯兵力ヲ一九四一年七月廿一日當時ハ夫レニ限定シ、更ニ右兵力ノ置換ヘヲ許サズ、如何ナル場合ニモ佛印ニ陸海空軍兵力ノ増強ヲナサザル者ノ保證ヲナスコト等ヲ含ンデ居タ。我ガ政府ハ對日輸出ニ關シ次ノ限度ニ於イテ是ヲ許スヤウ凍結令ノ修正ヲ保證スルデアラウ。即チ石炭及ビ船舶用品、或ル制限内ノ食糧品及ビ薬剤、月六十万弌ニ上ル原棉、現在民需用トシテ月々一般輸出ヲ許可サレテ居ル種類ノ内少量ノ石油米國ヨリノ輸出割合ニ就テハ、英蘭兩國政府ト協議ノ上決定スルコト等デアル。合衆國ハ一般輸入ヲ許可スルツモリデアルガ、但シ右輸入品價額ノ三分ノ二ハ生糸タルコトヲ條件トスル。斯カル輸入ノ賣上高ヲ以テ、日本ハ合衆國ヨリノ指定輸出品ノ購入及ビ、其ノ合衆國內ニ有スル債務ノ元利ノ支拂ニ充テ得ルモノトスル。我ガ政府ハ英、蘭、澳各政府ニ對シテ同様ノ經濟的措置ヲ取ルコトニ付交渉スルコトヲ保證スルデアラウ。

右仮條約案ヲ考究スルニ當リ、或ルニ就イテハ、英、蘭、濠、支各國政府ノ在華代表ト協議ヲ遂ゲタノデアル。

十一月廿五日ニ支那大使ハ自分カラ國務長官ヲ訪問シ、我々ガ考慮中ノ仮條約案ニ關スル屢次ノ演説ニ對シ蒋介石ガ各方面ヲ遍ジテ既シタ幾ツカノ電報中ニ表明セルソノ態度ニ就キ、多クノ豫備的説明ヲ試ミント努メタ。大使ハ蔣介石ガ米國政府ハ支那問題ヲ無視シテ支那ヲ犠牲ニシテマデモ（以下引用）尙モ日本ヲ厭撫セントスル。（引用終）モノデアルト考ヘテ旨ノ支那外交部長ヨリノ電報ノ寫シヲ國務長官ニ手交シタ。右電報中ニ於イテ、外交部長ハ蔣介石ニ對シ、國務長官ガ常ニ根本的原則ニ對スル最大ノ尊重ヲ表明シテ居ルコト、同卿ガ仮條約ノ可能性ニ就イテ尋ねタコトカラモ未だ日本ニ對シ何等ソ譲歩モナサレテ層ナイトガ明ラカル旨ヲ告ゲタト述べ居ル。支那外相部長ハ更ニ自國ノ困難ヲ増大セシメ若クハ日本ノ侵略的勢力ヲ強化スルヤウナ如何ナル措置ニ對シテモ既著反對スル旨重テ断言シテ居ル。

國務長官ハ、太平洋全域ニ亘ル廣範國ナ平和解決策ヲ見出サントシテ日本側トノ會談ガ取ル程度進捗シテ居リ、且ツ日本側ニ於テモ斯ル意圖ノモトニ

ソノ様ナ會議ヲ機行スルコトヲ觀ク希望シテキル旨文部へ使ニ告ゲタノデアル。

國務長官ハ蔣介石並ニ同夫人ガ極ク最近ニ華府宛ニ甸緬公路ガ極度ノ危険ニ曝サレテキル旨ヲ強調シ以テ援助ヲ請ヘル長文ノ激烈ナル電報ヲ多ク寄セテ來タコトヲ指摘シタ。ソコデ國務長官トシテ、大統領及ビ彼自身ノ現在檢討シツツアルの條約案ノ主要眼目ノ一ハ實ニ蔣介石ニヨツテ指摘サレタ緊迫セル危險カラ甸緬公路ヲ防護スル點ニアルコトヲ指摘シタノデアル。國務長官ハ更ニ語ラツイデ、蔣介石ハ後條約案ガ就中印度支那カラ支那及ビ其ノ通商諸々含ム南太平洋全域ニ對スル日本ノ脅威ヲ除クモノデアル點ヲ明ラカニ看過シテキルト述べタ。而シテ國務長官ハ我ガ國ニ於ケル關係事務局ノ意見ニ依レバ、現ニ考慮中ノ後條約案ニ基ヅキ其ノ九十日ノ期間内ニ日本ガ限ラレク量ノ石油類ヲ入手シタドコロデ夫レニヨツテ日本ノ軍備ガ著シク増強サレルヤウナコトハ決シテナイ（反復、決シテナイ）トイフコトヲ指摘シタ。合衆國內ノ狀勢及ビ一般世界狀勢、特ニ前記各國政府ノ反應及ビ返答ヲモ含メテ、其ノ諸要圖ヲ慎重検討セル後、我々ハ考慮中ノ後條約案ヲ打切ルコト

ニ決定シタノデアル。

當國務省ハ、十一月二十六日ニ日本大使ニ手交セル文書並ニ當日行ハレタル會談ノ内容ヲ別送ノ祝電報ニヨツテ貴方ニ通報済ミデアル。

ハル

Excerpts from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. VIII

Page 2893

Wednesday, February 6, 1946  
Congress of the United States  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Washington, D. C.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN DALTON KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Richardson. . . . Captain, will you give your name in full to the reporter?

Captain Kramer. Captain Alwin Dalton Kramer, United States Navy.

• • • •

Page 3894

. . . In June of 1938 I was ordered to the Navy Department, Washington, and assigned to the Far East Section of the Division of Intelligence. For the next approximate year and a half I had the Japanese desk in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. Part of that time I was assigned to the Communications Security Group under then Commander Safford.

In June of 1940 I was assigned to that section of Commander Safford's office on a full-time basis and remained on that duty until June of 1943.

. . . I was in charge of a section of the Division of Naval Communications which was a subsection under then Commander Safford, known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20 being the designation of the then Commander Safford, known as the Communications Security Group.

GZ was the subsection concerned with the translation of decrypted ciphers and the recovery of Japanese codes. My permanent assignment was to the Far East section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. My status was a loan status to OP-20-GZ.

VOL. IX

Page 4044

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you this: you made up a file down in your office, you had the fourteenth part, the 13 parts and the other parts at 8:15.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you kept them on your desk until the time came for you to leave and go over to the White House?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When you got to the White House, it was about what time?

Captain Kramer. I should say about a quarter of 10 sir, because my recollection is I was at the State Department after leaving the White House at 10 minutes to 10.

Page 4046

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Mr. Hull at all that morning?

Captain Kramer. I think I saw him, but whether it was in his office or passing through his outer office going in, I am not at present certain. In the case of Mr. Knox I can be specific, because I arrived there before he did and pointed out the 14th part in the folder which I handed him.

Senator Ferguson. So you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Page 4047 -48

... As the result of seeing the 1 o'clock message I ... directed immediate preparations of another set of folders, with a view to departing again for delivery as early as possible.

Senator Ferguson. And in that folder--and you have told us what was in it, it was the 1 o'clock message, the pilot message, the burning of the last code machine message--

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the two so-called "thank you" messages?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you have that folder completed?

Captain Kramer. I believe the total time I was in my office was not over 10 minutes. It was probably less than that.

Senator Ferguson. That let you go out at what time?

Captain Kramer. About 10:30, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 10:30. And you then went to see McCollum?

Captain Kramer. I went first to Admiral Stark's office, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. And McCollum came to the door of Admiral Stark's office, at which time I pointed out the new material I had in the folder, specifically the 1 o'clock delivery message, and explained very briefly and hurriedly its possible and probable tie-up with the movement of the Japanese convoy and contemplated Japanese action against the British and Thailand. My distinct recollection is that McCollum grasped that point almost instantaneously, and I then departed from the State Department, after not more than probably one-half minute's conversation.

Page 4051

Senator Ferguson. When you came back to the office did you feel certain they were going to attack Britain that morning?

Page 4051 (continued)

Captain Kramer. I felt reasonably certain in my own mind; yes, Senator Ferguson. Before 1 o'clock our time, that Britain would be attacked?

Captain Kramer. Probably about 1 o'clock; yes, sir.

• • • •

Page 4052-53

Senator Ferguson. . . . Then you went over to Secretary Knox's office?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you met Colonel Bratton?

Captain Kramer. Either he or one of his senior assistants.

Senator Ferguson. And some aides to Secretary Knox?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was it--

Captain Kramer. Secretary Hull.

Senator Ferguson. Secretary Hull? Was the meeting over then?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. My purpose in hurrying so rapidly from Admiral Stark's office was to get to the State Department before that meeting broke up.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get there?

Captain Kramer. I am less specific on the time I arrived there, but I should say it would be about a quarter of 11.

Senator Ferguson. Did you walk?

Captain Kramer. I walked again as I had on the earlier trip.

Senator Ferguson. So you got there about a quarter to 11, you think?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It may have been nearer 11 o'clock.

It was part of my remarks when I was explaining to Mr. Hull's secretary the significance, the likely significance of this 1 o'clock time in Washington and its tie-up with the movement of the sun. In other words, time of day in the South China Sea. My recollection is that I mentioned something about the time of day at Pearl Harbor and that point in the conversation.

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Captain Kramer. The previous evening when I was in Secretary Knox's apartment, after he had read the folder of traffic, he directed me to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning where there would be a meeting between he, Mr. Hull, and, I gathered, Mr. Stimson.

辯護側文書 第一五〇〇號 - H - 6

「真珠灣攻撃」抜萃

(ワシントン) 會衆國政府印刷局 一九四六年一

第八卷

第二八九三頁

一九四六年二月六日 水曜日

會衆國議會真珠灣攻撃聯合調查委員會

ワシントン、デイー、シー

會衆國海軍アルワイン、ダルトン、クレイマー大佐證言

リチャード・スン氏、「大佐、貴下ノ官姓名ヲ譲事記録者ニオ告ゲ下サイ。」  
クレイマー大佐、「アルワイン、ダルトン、クレイマー米國海軍大佐」

第三八九四頁

Dof. Doc. No. 1500 H 6

人員ニ指命サレマシタ。

概メ一年半ノ間私ハ海軍情報部樅東局日本課ノ席ヲ占メテ居リマシタ。ソノ間一時サフオード長官ノ下ニ交通通信保全班附ニ指名サレタコトガアリマス。一九四〇年六月サフオード長官ノ班附ヲ専任ニ命ぜラレ、一九四三年六月マデソノ職ニ居リマシタ。

私ハ海軍交通通信部ニ於テサフオード長官ノ下ノ一分課OPTELEGRAM呼バレル一課ニ席ヲ置イテ居リマシタ。OPII-10ト申スノハ當時ノ長官サフオード氏ニ屬シタ交通通信保全班ノ呼稱ザアリマシタ。

G2ハ暗號ノ傳讀及ビ日本暗號書ノ復原ニ關スル分課デアリマシタ。私、恒久的ノ配屬ハ海軍情報部樅東局ザアリマシタ。私ノ地位ハOPII-10 G2ヘノ派遣員デアリマシタ。

第三九九二頁

fa...ucc. 15. h 6  
ファーギュスン上院議員「貴下ニ伺ヒマス、貴下ハ書類ノ綴リヲ貴下ノ室ニ作ツテアリ、八時一五分ニハ第十四部、十三部及他ノ部ガアリマシタネ?」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス。」

ファーギュスン上院議員「テ、貴下ハ白聖館ニ出掛ケル時間ガ來ルマデソノ書類ヲ貴下ノ机ノ上ニ置イケオカレテイマシタネ?」

クレーマー大佐「現在記憶スル限りデハゾウデアリマス。」

ファーギュスン上院議員「貴下ガ白聖館ニ着カレマシタ時ハ何時頃デシタカ?」

クレーマー大佐「一〇時一五分前頃ト思ヒマス、何故ナラ私ノ記憶スル所デハ白聖館ヲ去ツテ國務官ニ着イタノガ一〇時一〇分頃ト思ヒマスカラ」

第四〇四六頁

ファーギュスン上院議員「其ノ朝貴下ハ「ハル」氏ニ逢ヒマシタガ。」

クレーマー大佐「私ハ逢ツタト思ヒマス。シカシソレガ彼ノ室ノ内デアツタカ又ハ室ニ入ラウトシテ外テアツタカ現在デハ確カテアリマセン。唯ノツクス氏ニ就イテハ確言出來マス。何故ナラ私ハ彼ガ來ル前ニソノ室ニ至リ、彼ニ書類挟ミヲ渡シテソノ十四部ヲ示シタカラテアリマス。」  
ファーギュスン上院議員「テハ貴下ハ個人的ニ第十四部ヲノツクス氏ニ見セタノデスカ。」  
クレーマー大佐「然ウテアリマス。」

第四〇四七頁一四〇四八頁

一時ノ通告ヲ見ルト私ハ出來ルダケ早クソレヲ届ケルタメニ直チニ  
他ノ書類挟ミヲ用意スルヤウ命ジマシタ。

ファーギュスン上院議員「デ、ソノ書類挟ミノナカニハ、貴下が何ガ入ツテ  
居ダカチ告ゲラレマシタガ」

ソレハ一時ノ通告、飛行機搭乗員通告、最後ノ暗號解讀器、焼却ニ關スル通  
告デアリマシタネ」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス」

ファーギュスン上院議員「間違アリマセンネ」

クレーマー大佐「アリマセン」

ファーギュスン上院議員「ソレカラ所謂「感謝」通信ガニ通デシタネ」

クレーマー大佐「ソウデアリマス」

ファーギュスン上院議員「書類挟ミノ内容ガ整ツタノハ何時頃デシタカ」

クレーマー大佐「私ガ自室ノ内ニ居ツタノハ全部デ一〇分足ラズト用ヒマス

カラソレ以内デアリマス」

フアーギュスン上院議員「デ出掛ケラレタノガ何時デスカ」

クレーマー大佐「一〇時三〇分頃デアリマス」

フアーギュスン上院議員「一〇時三〇分ソレカラマツク、コラム氏ニ逢ヒニ行カレタノデスネ」

クレーマー大佐「議員、私ハ最初スターク提督ノ事務室ニ行ツタノデアリマス  
フアーギュスン上院議員「左様」

クレーマー大佐「マツク、コーラムハ丁度スターク提督ノ入口ニ來合セタノデ  
アサマス。ソコデ私ハ書類挿ミニ持ツテ來タ新材料チ示シ、特ニ一時送信ノ通  
告チ示シテ、ソレト日本護送船團トノ可能ニシテ且起リ得ベキ關係及ビ英國ト  
タイ國ニ對スル日本ノ行動企圖トヲ簡單ニ且急イデ説明シタノデアリマス。  
私ノハツカリシタ記憶デマツク、コーラムハ要點チ瞬時ニ捉ヘタノデ私ハ一分  
半程ノ會話ノ後ニ國務省ヲ去リマシタ。

第四〇五一页

ファーギューン上院議員「海軍省ニ歸ツタ時貴下ハ日本ガ其ノ朝英國ヲ攻  
撃スルト（確實）思ハレマシタカ」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス。種々ノ推理カラ合理的ニ確實デアルト  
ヘマシタ。」

ファーギューン上院議員「米國時間一時前ニ英國ガ攻撃ヲ受ケルト考ヘラ  
レマシタカ」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス。多分一時頃ニ」

第四〇五二一五三頁

ファーギューン上院議員「ソレカラ貰下ハノツクス長官ノ室ニ行カレタノ  
デスネ」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス」

ファーギューン上院議員「デ、ブラトン大佐ニ逢ハレタノデスネ？」

クレーマー大佐「彼デアツタカ彼ノ高級副官カデアリマシタ。」

ファーギューン上院議員「デ、ノツクス長官ノ補佐官トモ會ハレマシタネ」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデアリマス。」

ファーギュスン上院議員「ソレハ——」

クレーマー大佐「ハル長官デアリマス」

ファーギュスン上院議員「ハル長官？ デハ會議ハ既ニ終ツテ居ツタノデスカ。」

クレーマー大佐「然ウテハアリマセん。スターク提督ノ下カラ非常ニ急イダト謂フノハ會議ガ終ルマデニ國務省ニ着カウトシタカラデアリマス。」

ファーギュスン上院議員「何時ニ着カレマシタカ」

クレーマー大佐「何時ニ着イタカハ非常ニ不確實ナノデスガ一時一五分前頃デシタラウ」

ファーギュスン上院議員「貴下ハ歩カレタノデスカ」

クレーマー大佐「前回ト同様歩キマシタ」

ファーギュスン上院議員「テ一一時一五分前頃ニ着イタトオ思ヒデスネ？」

クレーマー大佐「然ウデス。大体一一時近イ頃デシタラウ」  
「ハル氏ノ秘書官ニコノ文書ノ重要性フ説明シテ居ル間ニ私ハワシントン  
時間一時ト謂フコトノ重要性及ビソノ大陽ノ運行トノ關聯ニツイテ一部前  
及シマシタ。言ヲ換ヘレバ南支那海ノ時間ニ就イデアリマス。覺エテ居リ  
マスガ私ハ右ノ會話ノウチデ眞珠灣時間ニ就イテ何カ述べ、且コノ點ニ觸レ  
タト思ヒマス。」

第八卷

第三九〇七頁

クレーマー大佐、前夜私ガノツクス長官ノ下ニ参リコレデ彼ガ交通關係ノ  
書類ヲ讀ミオヘテカラ、習朝一〇時ニ國務省ニノツタス、ハル、ソレニオ  
ソラクスチムソン氏等ノ會合ガアルカラ來ル様ニト私ハ彼カラ云ハレマシ  
タ。

D. D. 1500-I-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
27 May 1940.

Secret

27 MAY 1940.

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow - well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask - suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

(2) The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also - like you - I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule

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Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
27 May 1940.

in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status - go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel: - Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 171,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently. I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as -

- (a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
- (b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
- (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
- (d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
- (e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
- (f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
- (g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
27 May 1940.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet;\*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies, - I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1, - modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that now appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant (4) from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made, - for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic - should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so

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Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
27 May 1940.

that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands: - We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter - as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN  
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,  
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

No. 1

Defense Doc. 1500-1-1

テイクー 一五〇一ワイ一

エーケー・アーヴィング提督ヨリ二十七年六月  
ノンヘ、一函。年賀二十七日附書翰

秘

一九四〇年五月二十七日

敬愛のバグリーへ二十二日附書翰只今ハ考  
シタ。貴翰、各項毎二十答ヘル承致シキト思フ。  
ダガオ一二貴下、当面シテ辛ハ困難ハ驚ト承知  
シテ本ルコトク申上ゲ本省モ然々ハ同じ問題  
ニツカ、テ頭ヲ懸てシテ本ル事実ヲ貴下ニ即  
伝ヘシリイ。

何故貴下ハハワ山地区ニ在ルヤ  
答。其ハ貴下が其處ニ居ル事ニ依リ日本軍  
、東印度進駐ヲ食に止ム結果ニナルト心懶  
サレルが故ナシ。以前、手紙ニ於テ私ハ此ト  
伊太利、參戰、関係サセテ見タ、テアヒ某實  
係ハ伊太利、參戰ト共ニシダケ日本軍が独自  
行動、孰ルニ自由ナ氣持ニアルダラフト心ハ  
ナキトイフ事アハ。然ハ独併兩國が彼等  
、限リ日本ハ蘭領東印度ニ於テ活躍自  
在ザアルト日本ニ卷ケリモノト信スル。  
スルト當然貴下ハ次、質問ヲ幾スルカ知ヒ  
ソナラバ、伊太利ト戰爭ニ就テハ如何ト。

Defense Doc. 1500-I-1

私ハ信スベキ筋ノ傳ヘル所ヨリ過去ニ過去ニ種々之機  
會ニ於テ、伊太利ガニ面時、豫告ヲ以テ參戰シ  
トイフ事ヲ我々ハ承知セル旨ヲ云ヒ得ル、來ルベキ十日  
以内ニ、伊太利ノ參戰が凡ナラント述ベク者元他ニア  
私自身トシテハ、冷徹ナル論理ガ伊太利ヲニテ茲當  
分、參戦セシメヌ様ニスルダラト述ベリ。其トが一般ノ  
觀測ナ、デアル。此ノ予紙が貴下、平元ニ居ク頃  
マテニハ、トケラカニ決定シテキルヤモ知レサ。南佛ニ在  
リテハ、事態ガ急速ニ推移シソツアル。

上ニ述ヘタ事カラ、貴下ハ、自ラ現情勢、如何ニ足  
メキモナルカヲ察知シ得ヨア。提起サドキ一、莫  
向ニ闇聯シテ、貴下ハ当然カラ訊ネルテアラ、  
若シ日本軍ガ東印度ヘ、進駐ヲ敢テスルトシト  
如何、其ノ場合、我々ノ孰ルベキ策如何ト、私  
、答ハ次ノ如クデアル。私ハ知ラヌシ、又神ノ造  
給フタ縁、地球上ノ何人ト虽モえラ貴下ニ云ニ  
得ル者ハ本ナイト思フ。ホワイト・ハウス、及び國務  
省ニ於ケル比ニ闇シテ、私自身ノ意見ガ貴下  
、最近、書稿中ニ述グラレテキル、竟向ト趣旨  
ヲ同ジタルモノニアルト云フ事ハ承知シテキル。

私ハ一言指摘シケイト因ハ、ソレハ日本軍  
ガ萬一蘭領東印度ヘ、進攻ヲ決定スルニ至ル  
トモ合衆國ハ、何等断乎タル行動ニ出デトイド云ア  
、カ假ニ當方、決定アルトシテモ、之ハ何人ニモ覺エ  
スベキコトデナイ。ソニナ事ヲスレバ、貴下ガコハツレし地区ニ居

八〇、三

Defense Doc. 1500-1-i

(1) 墓室ノ全貌見ゆキモニシテアラカニテアリ  
且本署ノ所ガ如何ナヒ行勅ニ出ハカラシラヌ  
又如ラヌ以上ハ清潔ニ因ニ止マビカモ知ヒナリト  
事ヲ一寸思ヒ浮ベラタク。コラムノ芳ハ私ハ當所  
ニ於テハ極ク内慮ニシテキテ本ル。

(2) 上述也所ガ何故署下が其處ニ在ヒヤ、莫  
論ニ實ヘルモノト思フ其レハ貴下が恐ラクド  
留マシカニ固ニ貴間ニハ答ヘテ居ナリ。  
此情報ハ之ヲ得次第直ク貴下ニ心ペオ傳  
ハスル何人モ今、折ソシ答ヘ心事ハ出来ナリタ.  
是不同称私モ同じ間ヲ覺シタノが貴下同様  
自己元答ノ得ル事ハ出来ズニ外ハシ。

私ハ切ニ詰シラシタ飽鑑手演習前書  
ノ中ニサヘモ貴下が何ヲ懸ニテ本ルカラヨリ承知  
シテ本ル。私ハ本省ニ限リ。貴下が當分  
或ニ演習ヲ省略シ貴下が重複ナリト思惟  
シシテ成就スベキ手段ノ手を講フテモ他  
演習ト代ヘテ貴下が適當と見ル如何也方  
法ニ於テ元砲艦予豫定討畫ヲ依頼不自量  
貴下ハ精ツテ本ル申上ケル事ハ出来ル。特ニ貴  
下が近距離射撃演習ヲ止メテ、長距離  
演習成ルハ分艦隊演習又ハ実動演習  
某、但専空演習等々合併何テモ貴下

No.4

Reference Doc. 1500-7-1

。が艦隊、明確ナリ也現れ。於テ艦隊、利益ナリト思フナラバヤリ  
給ヘ、但ニ必不絶工兵移行。報告シテ是を給ヘ  
我方ハ貴下ニ彈薙及ニ圖シテ我方、當為レツツ  
アレ所ヲ報知シテ、我方ハ貴下、欲スル如何  
下に度更ニ元老院又心樹ケル積モ了ル也。  
我方ハ入渠莫、他ノ後東海岸ニ船ヲ歸航  
也じ代提言ヲ入ル事、自由裁量ヲ貴下ニ許  
シタ。貴下ハ畢竟ヲ攻戰行動、毫也上シ  
同地ニ在ル元老院ヤア間ヲ。答答、或の條件  
下ニ於テ、勿論ソウニ乞フ可知シヌが前達大  
所カラ既ニ御承知、遂ニ明確ナリ解收倉八  
年へ得ラタリテ、然ハ貴下が極度準備  
目的于西海岸ニ歸ル事、諸利益ニ就キ言ツテ本  
ルコトハ問題外ナルコトヲ、實感入。若ニ貴下が歸ル貴  
下、ハコト、帶在、主タ理由ハナクナルコトニテラウ。マサニ此  
問題が当所ニ持出サヒ。然心中コトツキ入渠、爲  
武器、糧食等積込、爲東海岸ニ船ヲ歸航セシム後  
限ヲ有三千斗ル。ソシテコレハド道役立ツ事上也。/  
人員、据置ニ關ニシテミツクハ貴下、前二人員ノ問  
題、提出シテ松ハ唯然々、數字ヲ水兵十七万(或答  
シカスル)十七万三千三百二十六又海兵三万四千ニ上界  
セシ爲百方手ヲ盡シテ來タト云フ事ヲ申上。此程度  
ニ此問題ニ觸レテ異議ナシ。若ニ然ラガ之ヲ認メテ構ハ

Defence Doc. 1500-1-1

六年度、人員數二萬三千人、貴下の安心出来心事上思  
フ。和最近六十四隻、駆逐艦並其他、艦船ヲ就役セ  
ムルニ就イテ艦隊ガ蒙ラカルヲ得タカツタ劇搖ヲ知フ  
ナリ。私ハコト、劇搖が終フアクトヲ感謝シテキル。私次  
來心劇搖ガ出來ルケレバ軽キ事ヲ欲ニテキル又貴下の航  
海部ガコト、海上艦隊が負フ此、不可避ナ重荷ヲ輕減入  
心有文ヤ其、最善ヲ盡スモト思フ。私ハ假令今ハ次  
如キ何事ニモ閣セズ貴下ハワイ滞在ガ何等力、間  
接的或附隨的結果ヲ得ラルコトヲ欲ニテキタ。

- (1) 合衆國カラ供給糧食ノミナノ眞珠灣ニ於ルノ  
處置及貯藏、合ム計算上、關係諸問題、解決  
(2) (a) 貴下が戰爭狀態下ニ於クナス訓練  
(b) 機動部隊ヨリノ實行之得化限ニ於テニシテ  
アリニヤン、ハムラ、ジョンストン、サモア、一般地域  
ニ精通セシムコト。  
(以下次回)

No. 5

(二) 陸軍上、一層緊密な連絡及び陸海両軍の作戦未見の上から以上、八〇個地已、共同行動。

(三) 陸海軍協同二隊の關係連絡問題、解決及  
"特ニ、空本連絡二重実現ノコト。

(四) (ハ) 艦船連隊隊旗、軍令。

(五) 八〇個隊八、准備才了、島ノケテナ、スワル多數  
以テ構成テシヤウン、実現ヲ強調スコト。

章下ハ、ハラミ同記、平時作戰基地上に備後也、  
多引留メラトク、半八十分、半之コト相当程度、章下  
に直面セシテ本此事カラ皆、些細來ニ生下テリ。

艦隊能率、減少並漸々、如キ大艦隊ニテハ不適當  
續也、航行場、諸般、施設、配處、厚生條件、等、因士氣  
、低下、閑散ハ、松、章下ニ物力出来、ヨイカト為、  
半、私八海軍兵學校卒業後、最初、數年間ヲ西印度  
諸島、過土、松、二十二月間、滞在後入港シ、半  
月間移動、シテ、最後、港、潛工丁居心、而モ真底  
、自人、唯、一人モ居、ナリ。松、知子モ、偉大士解  
毒藥、作業並、帆走、隻、金、競技、煙火、自由、会  
等、如、自解、停、生、个、章下、久機動艦隊、海  
上、散策、気分軽快、為、勤ラスコトも相當未未、但  
、三十十、何時、モ本來、程度、度、下、ガ。章下、方ノ  
要、是心、然、巡航、為、油、精用、然、勿解  
決、コト。

6/6

Ref Doc 1300-1-1

五月二十二日付、軍委會より、第六艦隊、一部ヲ大西洋  
ニ移動カラムを知レス。予テヨリ、ハタチハ小移動カモ知レヌ  
ニ成、又ハ修正ヲシテ、シイノホリ、第一号即テ想定  
及ビ艦隊配置圖化修正ヲ加ヘタ、シイノホリ、第一号云々<sup>ノ</sup>  
大船を知トナシ。換言スレバ、彼々が直面化カモ知レヌ情勢  
ト言フ、ハシ、情勢下ニ於テ、伊國及松島、艦隊、自由  
行動、出来ズ。巡洋艦ヲ一隻カツラ南大西洋派  
遣ス。日本本邦を知レヌト云ノ様、ナ情勢アリ。斯  
如キ場合、非常事態、大規模艦隊、大西洋、巡洋艦  
要ハナシ、艦隊、太平洋維持、帶在、セ、空軍、資  
化、軍艦、維持スルトニラウ。今ニモ起ルカモ知レ  
ニ情勢ニ備ヘバ為ニ斯、如修正、シイノホリ、情況、  
下ニ大西洋ニ召致セラシヤモ知レヌ。部隊、巡洋艦、  
一分艦隊、空母、駆逐艦隊、著カスル輕水雷敷  
設艦隊乃至、哨戒飛行隊、及若シカズト、一寸アリニ  
外門脇伴、ツクノ水戦隊ヨリ成ハモ、アラウ  
甚シ要下ガ機動部隊、アリニシニコト又中郎  
太平洋並南太平洋、行イカハ稍久遠イ(4)諸  
島、現察サセテアバ、斯カル召致ガカリ可能性  
ス、如艦隊、大西洋派遣、為、一ガルアラニ  
御存ニ要連カシメ。

尚又海軍部隊、南方ヘ、行動、同地域、佛領  
或、英領、訪問、主要卜入情報、於發生不下モ知レヌ。予  
記シテバラス。彼々の情勢、變化發展、心ジ

1/19

Log Doc 1500-1-1

7. 貢下方是時議事會本知不詳、努力不續、不當也。  
我久々、貢下、補助斧行場、對二子、信號許可手續  
心上、信、配處人、來アタモ、上信、此上來、我久々、舊  
現役議會、審議中、了、一週同様、八九月ノ登入  
八九法律案、件二、問題、國ニテ何カ恒久的、數量  
為、六月、當局、監視中、了、了、附、加八月、本  
來。

艦隊、訓練部、最近、貢下、標的、及ビ一般標的  
訓練設備、閱兵書面、送アタ、欲之此、情勢、  
於、貢下、援助、化為、為之得心、謂、事、運、者、不、也；  
三將軍、權、情勢、於、大、十四、當、近、一周、工、面、自、リ、テ  
此、何カ恒久的、を、シカ、生、大、モ、上、信、本。

空、情勢、國ニテ、貢下方、調査、完了、やう、手續  
、軍、善、決定、やう、今、國ニテ、何、モ、同、御、手續  
、用意、が、也。

八月、有、艦隊、正規、指揮系統、令、制、六月、  
三國ニテ、一、当然、我久々、問題、全面的、貢下、參  
、參、不。若、艦隊、一部、大、而、詳、岸、持、シ、未、ラ、シ、ク、  
或、艦隊、主力、面、海、岸、力、要、送、タ、シ、タ、財、ハ、想、モ、角、モ、  
現在、八月、有、艦隊、編成、八個、二、八月、三、残、二、  
置、八、機動、部隊、編成、六コト、大、ノ、津、要、了、ア、

コ、書面、非常、散漫、モ、了、秋、貢下、年、紙、諸、事、  
財、全、被、考、出、シ、モ、有、也。計、ア、ス、セ、シ、書、平、  
艦船、大、西洋、送、ア、不、ア、ス、了、生、大、可、能、性、ア、略

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Def Doc 1500-1-1

速七八月廿二日門真下家、書面而至東下ガ書面  
シテ所ニ日本タソシテ取ラシムタナヘ紙ト開聯手讀人  
會復ナシ。

著ニ東下ガノ書面並ニ前回書面アリ。但總  
ニ唐風セドサルナム。欲ビニタリ。自命ハ微ニモ終工大  
智ラシ。遺直ナシイ。ダガラ。

私、一層特殊ナリ。何事ニモハ未得心限リ。連次  
ア東下ニ傳知アスル考アリ也。清元氣高。為筆  
ヲ新リ。故具

鑑別ノベシ。

ハク。眞珠港合衆國軍艦、ベニルガラナ。客  
合衆國艦隊司令長官

提督丁。オ。リナドン机下  
ニ申ヨリ。ハ情勢ニ全ク危機一發アリ。今  
ハ今再び確実上思心。心情較現シタ今ア一期  
日暮ヘリ。六月五日迄。八作勤。起入力を知ス。然  
シム尚ア。相像ニ止ム。

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D. D. 1500-I-2

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
7 January 1941.

A16/ UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,  
January 7, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to  
Com 14 Conf. Ltr.  
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14  
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.



From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet  
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense  
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area

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CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet  
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense  
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to:  
Com FOURTEEN

デエー・オー・リチャードソンヨリエイチ・アール・スタークヘノ手紙

一九四一年一月七日

合衆國艦隊

旗艦 U.S.S. ニューメキシコ

連續 ○二二

布畦・眞珠灣 一九四一年一月七日

極  
秘

第一裏書送先 第十四海軍區司令官極秘書翰

O-A16-114A7-2ND14

一九四〇年十二月三十日（六二九）

差出人ハ 合衆國艦隊司令長官  
名宛人ハ 海軍作戦部長



題目ハ艦隊防禦ニ關スル態勢及奇襲ニ對スル地方防衛軍ノ現在ノ能力  
 一轉送 司令長官ハ第十四海軍區司令官及ハワイ地區總司令官トノ會  
 及彼トノ共同調査ノ結果第十四海軍區司令官ニ情報ガモタラサレ彼  
 手紙ノ原文ヲ作成シタ。司令長官ハ現在ノ陸軍追擊隊及高射砲陣デ  
 艦隊及眞珠灣ヲ空襲ニ對シテ守ルノニハ不充分デアルトイフ意見デ  
 十四海軍區司令官ト一致シテキル、モシ今建案ノ追擊軍ガ確定出來タ  
 ラ充分デアラウ。コノ地域ニオイテ總數六十八ノ三インチ移動高射砲  
 デハ足リナイ。コノ地域ノ殆ンド連續的ナ高空ノ狀況下ニ於テハ口經  
 大ノ着弾距離ノヨリ遠イ高射砲ガ多量ニアルコトガ眞珠灣高空爆撃ニ  
 對抗スルタメニ必要デアル。

二高射砲陣ヤ追擊隊モマダ當分増強スル事ガ出來ナイカラ敵機ニヨル攻  
 撃ノ場合ニハ眞珠灣ニ居アハセノ艦隊ノ一部ニヨツテ眞珠灣内ノ艦隊  
 戰衛ハ増強サレホヘナラヌデアラウ、地方防衛軍トノ協力計畫ガ今作  
 成サレツ、アル。現在ノトコロ空母戰闘機隊又ハ高射砲陣ヲ當時使用  
 デキルヨウナ準備ハ企圖サレティナイ、司令長官ノ考デハ現狀下ニカ

カル攻撃ハナイデアラウト云フコトハ艦隊航空隊ニ必要ナ訓練ヲ全ク中止シナクテモヨイト云フコトデアル。ソレ等艦隊航空隊ハ常ニ戦闘機ノ待機準備ヲ必要トサレルナラバ大巾ニ削減サレルノデアル。

三、灣内ニオケル行動ヲ特ニ大型船舶ノ行動及偵察機ノ離着陸等ヲ大巾ニ制限シナクテ水雷機攻撃ニ對シテ灣内ニ碇泊中ノ船ヲ守ルタメ灣内ニ水雷妨害装置ヤ網ヲ仕掛ケル實用的ナ方法ハナイヨウニオモワレル、眞珠灣ハ艦隊ニトツテコノ地域ニオケル唯一ノ作戦基地デアル以上コノヨウナ基地使用ヲヨリ以上制限スルヨウナ受動的防衛手段ハ避ケルベキデアル。コノ點ヲ考慮シ又、現在ノ状態ニ於テハ斯ノ如キ來襲ノ先ヅアリ得ベカラザルコト、且ツ敵ガ戦時活潑ナ艦隊作戦ヲ犯シテ充分近距離マデ空母ヲ進メ得ルダケノ實力ヲ有シテキルトハ思ハレヌコト等ヲ考慮スル時カクノ如キ防禦装置ヲ敷設スルコトハ必要トハ思ハレヌ。

四、潜水艦ヤ機雷ニ對スル現在ノ防衛施設ハ今日ノ平和状態ニオイテハ十分デアルガ、水中音測對潛組織ガ速力ニ設置サルベキデアル、又第十

四海軍地區防衛部隊ニ入用ナ艦船特ニ掃海艇ヲ早速派遣セネバナラヌ  
 ニコレニ關シテ眞珠灣内ノ海軍設備及同灣ヲ基地トスル部隊ノ防衛ニ當  
 リ得ル防衛軍ヲ第十四海軍地區司令部へ急イデ送ルコトガ望マシイ。  
 合衆國艦隊ニ必要ナ行動ノ自由ヲ確保シ又重要ナ部隊ヲソノ能力ノ一  
 部シカ發揮シ得ヌ職務ニヘ他ニ船ガナイカラトイツテ一分派スルガ如  
 キコトノナイヨウニ、上述ノ防衛部隊ハ充分ナ防衛力ヲ有シ合衆國艦  
 隊ニ屬スル艦船ノ在不在ニハ關係ナク行動出來ルモノデアルベキデア  
 ル。又第十四海軍區ハ有力ナ防衛部隊ノ專屬ニ對シテ攻撃サレル可能  
 性モ又目的物モ遙カニ少イ大陸海軍區ヨリモズツト優先權ヲ與ヘラレ  
 ネバナラナイ

ジエー・オー・リチャードソン

寫シ送り先 第十四海軍區司令官

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT No. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

- (12) 5 September 1941, Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the  
World Situation.  
(Excerpt)

I. B. 122

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.

• • • • •

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, C

• • • • •

5. Japan - Economic

Because of the ever-increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase the deficiencies in these categories. These deficiencies are serious but are not likely to become dangerous before December 1, 1941. The fact that Japan is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the "incident" in China prevents any curative steps being taken.

The technical assistance which the Germans have been giving to Japan over a period of six months is no longer as welcome as it was before Germany's attack on Russia. That attack has precluded the possibilities of Japan's receiving machinery and implements of war from Germany. As a matter of fact, the Japanese are beginning to question whether the Tripartite Agreement has not brought far greater economic disadvantages than advantage to Japan in carrying out her plans for a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Asia. The Pro-Axis leaders are finding great difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is anything but prosperous. Because of the difficulties of labor shortage, lack of sufficient transportation facilities and lack of cooperation among the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or persuasion, the "sphere" is about to fall apart.

The action of the Netherlands East Indies in joining with the United States and Great Britain in embagoing goods to Japan was undoubtedly a severe blow, both economically and in prestige. The economic competition going on behind the scenes in Thailand, between Japan on the one hand, and Great Britain and China on the

other, will be increasingly significant. Recent information, however, indicates that Japanese banking interests are asking for a new loan of 25,000,000 Bahts from Thailand bankers, (in supplementing a loan of \$3,750,000 actually made to Japan early in August in order to pay for commodities purchased by Japan in Thailand). The influence of the Chinese, the traditional financiers of Siam, cannot be overlooked here.

The processes of economic warfare are so slow that, even if the status quo ante were to be established in China by way of settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese economic predominance in the East Asiatic area would still be so firmly established that several months would have to pass before the effects of the economic embargo would in itself influence Japanese action in the Far East.

The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance in East Asia as well as to try to persuade Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies through threats and promises to soften the impact their embargo has caused. Japan obviously does not want to go to war with the United States to achieve her economic objectives, but at the same time she feels that the achievement of these objectives is an essential part of her foreign policy.

The fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange; in order to obtain foreign exchange, she must have foreign trade, which, at present, is seriously curtailed. The stoppage of trade is reducing Japan's raw materials drastically - raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan and to her ability to wage war successfully. No other country even approaches the United States in importance to Japan's economic welfare, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the exports of Japan. Thus through the advantage the United States has gained through the embargo, Japan finds herself in a very poor bargaining position.

(Pages 1349 and 1353, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護側書類一五〇〇一三一三號

氹珠灣攻事調査ニ關スル共同委員會ノ書證

第三三號ヨリノ抜萃

米國第七十覽議第一會期

書證第三三號

陸軍省〇一八作戦監督課、ル

陸軍情報部情況判斷課

恭 告 デイストリフクト・オブ・コロンビア

I · B · 一二二

一九四一年九月五日

參謀長宛覺書

世界狀勢ニ關スル定期情況判斷略ニ關スル件



五 日本之經濟

DEF. LOC. # 1500-I-3

米國、英國及蘭領東印度ニヨル對日本輸出禁止措置ガ増々嚴重トナツ。尤  
ダ爲、日本ノ經濟事情ハ徐々ニデハアルガ、疑ヒナク惡化ノ一路ヲ辿  
ツテキル。日本ハ、常ニ戰爭資材ニ乏シク、十分ナ外國爲替取引ニ事  
缺キ、外國貿易ハ不足シ勝チデアツタ。輸出禁止ハ是等右ニ述べタルモ  
ノノ不備、不足テ均大セシメルノニ大イニ役立ツテキル。前述ノ缺陷ハ  
深刻ナモノテアルガ、未だ致命的トナルノハ恐ラク一九四一年十二月一  
日以後ハコトト黙バレル。日本ハ亦、支那ニ於ケル、臺灣、南洋島スル  
種々ノ財政問題ニ煩ハサレテキル爲、矯正的措置ヲ執リ得ナイデキル。  
六ヶ月以上ニ亘リ、獨逸ガ日本ニ與ヘテ居ツタ技術的援助モ、モハヤ今  
デハ獨逸ノ對ソ攻撃以前ノ時程ニハ期待シ得ナイ。此ノ攻撃ノ爲、日本  
ハ獨逸ヨリ機械類及戰爭器材ヲ受ケルノヲ阻バマレテシマツタノデアル。  
實際問題トシテ、日本ハ今ヤ、亞細亞ニ於ケル、共榮圏、計畫遂行上

リ見ツ、三國協定ニヨリ經濟的利益ヲ受クルヨリモ不利益トナルコトノ  
方ガ多方ツタノゾハ大驚歎を疑ヒ秀穂秀次又來タ。親権軸指導者達ハ  
獨逸トノ問題ヲ正當以テ應じ多太が國體を見出シテキル。

共榮國ハ到底鎔染シテキルトハ云ヘナイ。勢力不足ノ窮迫、十分ヲ  
キル交通ノ便宜ノ缺如、及ビ彈制的此點ハ說得サレテ、共榮國、三參加  
セシメラレタ人々ノ間ノ協力ノ十分ナラザルモノガアル爲ニ、共榮國、  
ハ正ニ分裂ノ危機ニ瀕シテキル。

米英ノ日本向物資人輸出禁止ニ蘭領東印度ガ参加シタコトハ、經濟的ニモ  
亦日本ノ威信ノ上カラ云ツテモ、致命的ナ打撃アルコトハ疑ヒテ容レ  
ナイ。泰國ナ背景ニシテ舞台裏ニ於ハレル日本對英支シ認證的ナ錯セ  
リ合ハシタ重要性ヲ加ヘルデアフウ。然シ最近ノ情報ニ依レバ、日本ノ  
銀行諸事業ハ泰國銀行ヨリ新タニ二五・〇〇〇・〇〇〇バートノ借款ヲ求  
メテキル。一はハ日本ガ泰國ニ於イテ購入セル諸物品ノ支拂勘定ノ爲ニ  
現ニ八月初メニ借り受ケタル三・七五〇・〇〇〇弗ニノボル借款ノ追加  
分デアル、古來ヨリシヤノノ金融ナ司レル營地支那人ノ勢力ハ看過スル  
ワケニハ行カヌ。

DEP. D OC. 1500-1-3  
經濟戰ノ進行度ハ極メテ緩慢ナモノアルカラ、假ニ日支間ノ鬭爭ガ解  
決サレテ支那ガ原狀ニ復歸スルニシテモ、東亞ニ於ケル日本ノ經濟的優  
位ハ依然トシテ尙動カシ難イモノデアル故、經濟的輸出禁止措置ガ夫自  
体トシテ極東ニ於ケル日本ノ行動ヲ左右スルニ至ルニハ尙數ヶ月ヲ要ス  
ルモノト思ハレル。

輸出禁止ノ究極スル所、日本ハ強壓、甘言等ノ手段ニヨリ英、米、蘭  
領東印度等ニ對シ說得ヲ試ミ輸出禁止ニヨツテ蒙ムレル衝擊ヲ緩和せん  
ト努力ベルヨトハモトヨリノコト、東亞ニ於イテ一層ノ援助ヲ獲得セン  
ト努メザルヲ得ナイヨトトナラウ。日本ハ米國ト戰爭ニ訴ヘテ迄モ其ノ  
經濟的諸目的ヲ達成セントハモトヨリ欲シナイノアルガ、又同時ニ  
是年語目的ノ達成ガ其ノ對外政策ニトリ本質的ニ缺クベカラザルモノア  
ルト意識シテキル。

事實ハ、依然トシテ、日本ガ其ノ製造工業乃至ハ大規模ナ戰爭準備ヲ  
支ヘルニハ重要諸原料ニ事缺ク點禦リナイノアル。夫等フ獲得スル爲

ニハ外國トノ爲替取引フ缺ク事ハ出來ナイ。外國爲替取引フモツニハ外國貿易ヲ行ハネバナラヌノデアルガ、コレハ現在ノ所、極端ニ切り詰メラレケキル。貿易ノ杜絶ノ爲、日本ノ諸原料、即ち其ノ根本的ナ生活安寧ノ爲ニセ又其ノ戰爭遂行能力ニドツテモ死傷ヲ制スル程ノ諸原料ハ激減フ示シテキル。日本ノ經濟的福祉ニ關シ、其ノ原料ノ供給源トシテ皆又其ノ輸出品ノ市場トシテモ、米國程重要ナ關係ニ在ル國ハニツトナイノアル。斯クシテ、輸出禁止ニ依リ米國ハ有利ナ地位ニ立ツトアルガ、其反面此ノ爲ニ日本ハ手ヲ打ツテモ極メテ不利ナ地位ニ立タセラルノアル。

Proceedings of Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Admiral J. O. Richardson - Tuesday, November 20, 1945.

.....  
(762) Senator BREWSTER. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the plans then in existence were called the "Orange" plan or the "O-1" plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. That was in 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Senator BREWSTER. And did that contemplate some manner of offensive action by the fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized.

.....  
Pages 293 - 294, Part 1 - "Pearl Harbor Attack"



辯護書類一五〇〇一一四

合衆國 第七九議會、第一會期

眞珠灣攻撃調查共同委員會議事錄

一九四五年（昭和二十年）十一月廿日 火曜日 デエ・オ・リチー

ドソン提督の證言より抜萃

（七六二）ブルウスター上院議員 十二月七日以前の計画では、西太平洋の  
一國の戦争を交へるやうな場合こそはその期間中における海軍の使命  
たるべきものと考へられたのは、貴下の御承知の範囲では、何であつたか  
リチャードソン提督、その頃あつた計畫は、所謂「オレンヂ」計畫とか「O-  
I」計畫とか呼ばれてゐたもので、これは余の意見としては、理論的には  
かなり健全なものであつたが、だが、その計畫の時間的要素は現實とは全く  
かけはなれてゐた。



十月のいつであつたか余は海軍作戦部長宛に手紙を書いて、今、當委員會の手許にある當時の「オレンデ」計畫に關する余の概念を廣範圍に亘つて述べておいた。

ブルウスター上院議員それは一九四〇（昭和十五年）のことか  
リチャードソン提督 一九四〇（昭和十五年）だつた。

ブルウスター上院議員 その計畫では艦隊を使つて攻勢の行動に出る何らかの方法について企圖されてゐた

リチャードソン提督

企圖されてゐた。が委任統治諸島の或る島々を偵察してこれを攻撃しようといふ初期の行動といひ又、一步一步南へ西へと移動し遂にトラック島を取るといふことは書かれであつた。時間内には絶対に實現きれないことであつた。

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 28, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CONVERSATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,  
LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japs made with special reference to the question of the proposed alliance. This caused me to remark in a somewhat hasty way that the negotiations for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments of the resisting nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, had sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek had his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility, that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk.

I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added that the extremist fire-eating elements in Japan, who have preached a general forward movement supported by the Army and Navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to do, or for such a movement, would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation, but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to consider his possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that they would virtually halt and engage in some movements into Thailand and into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front. The Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did not disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the conduct of diplomatic relations between several of our countries in these critical times.

C.H.

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK - CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES, PART 14.  
PAGES 1194 to 1197 inclusive,

辯護書證第一五〇〇號 一四五

國務省

會談覺書

日時 一九四一年十一月廿九日

首題 日米會談

參加者 國務長官ハル 及び 英國大使ハリハツクス卿

寫シ届ケ先。。。

英國大使は自己の要求により訪問した。私は直ちに判つたのであるが  
彼は何等特別の用向きがあつたのではなく特に考慮中の暫定條約の問題  
に關する大統領、私及び日本側との會談の反映を知るにあつた、このた  
め私は準備として侵華國民に抵抗する各政府間の外交關係を維持する方  
法は非常に複雑してゐて、かかる關係を苟しくも組織的な、安全な、且  
つ健全な方法で維持することは殆んど不可能なることを述べた。私は例  
へば蔣介石は多くのヒステリックな電報を國務省以外の各閣僚や政府の  
高級官吏に送つたことや、時としては大統領を無視してさえも、又事實

が何であるかの眞の觀念なしに、微妙な重大な状勢にまで這入り込んで行つた事實に言及した。私は次のよくなことを附言した。即ち蒋介石はこゝラシントンに居るその義弟をして一見何等はつきりした目的も抱かず時々言論界其他に有害なる報道を散布せしめたことやまたロンドンから通信員が来て居て當地の色々の官吏と會見する。それは全く彼等の特權であるが時として我等は皆余りに多忙でお互の意見を充分に了解せず事を遠ぶことがある等々、私はこのことが蒋介石が最近にやつた感情的事を爆發の場合に明かに例證されたことを述べた、このことに連關して私は次のように述べた即ちチャーチルが我等のこゝでの日本との交渉について蒋介石より激しい抗議を受けた時その抗議に對し彼に於て何等の異議を申立てないでそのまま私共の處にその抗議を取り次いだのがへかくして此等の交渉に對する私共の知れる限りの英國政府の獨自の見解を緩和し事實上抹殺した。もしそうしないで彼が強硬な電文を以て蒋介石に脅迫、後者に立直つて日本人及び獨逸人が示していると同様な熱意を以て取れよう告げたならば、そしてまた中國人の腰を弱める様なことや彼等に親善國の凡てが今や主として自己の安全を計り、中國と日本との和

解を強制しようと努めていることを告げたりしなかつた方が得策であつたと、かゝる方策により中國人は皆最善の手段が遂行されつゝあること又それは時が來れば結局日本が支那と和平交渉をしなければならぬ様になりそれに依り事件が解決するまでは断乎として戦ふ必要があると云ふことを了解すべきである。

Def. Doc. #1500-1-5  
私は外交的日米關係は終止したのも同然である旨又此の問題は今や陸海軍當局の手に移さるべきことを述べた。陸海軍當局には私は既に話をし價値があるかないか鬼に角自分の意見を述べておいた。私は自信を持つて次の様な可能性を考へず我國及太平洋の状勢に關心を持つ國々が抵抗の計画をなすのは重大な誤りであることを述べた。即ち日本がだしぬけに行動を探り意表外に出る用意の下に相當廣範囲の地域に展開し所々の地區や要所を占領した際には太平洋に關心を持つ平和國家が會議してこれ等新事態に對應する企圖を立てる時間の余裕のないであらうこと及びこれは日本國民の今や全面的にその線に沿うて更新された無制限征服の行動は恐らく向う見ずの暴舉でありそして最大の大膽さと冒險とを要するといふ理論に基づくものなること、

Def. 300. 42500-1-5

私はまた大使に落着いた極重なる日本政府は以前にも増して獨逸軍が冬までに露國から追い出されるか否やを見極めるために更に三十日間待つことを欲するだろうと言つた。私は次の如く附言した、即ち日本に於ける極端な熱血分子は陸海軍によつて支持された全面的前進行動を主張し多数日本民衆にかかる運動を熱望するよう導いたのであるが、これら分子は恐らく獨露の状勢に注意も疎々拂はないで彼等が相當期間唱導したこの暴挙に遁進するであろうと、少なくとも私は彼等が露國戰線に於ける結果を待ちつゝ殆んど「前進行動を」止めてタイ國及びビルマ路への何かの行動に入るであろう等と假定するよりはむしろ前述の可能性を全然眞實と考へない方が誤りであろうと言つた。

大使はこの後者の點に關しては保留的態度を取つたように私は思へたそれを証を期に於て我が方數ヶ國間の外交關係指導上の非常に混雜せる機構について私の述べたことに對して大使は不賛成ではなかつた、

シーニエイテ

合衆國議會眞珠灣攻擊調查委員會審問よりの抜萃

第十四部

一一〇四頁より  
一一九七頁まで

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
22 June 1940.

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. It rests partly upon the question as to what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final information as yet.

So all I can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness. By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.

The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration, we decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed there to care for the forces that must be maintained in the Honolulu area in any case.

Guantanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air fields on both sides of the Bay we are increasing the gun defenses by four 6" guns and four 3" antiaircraft guns. In the near future we will send about 105 additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed, we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.

I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for the Pacific. We plan to load these transports with combat units of the Fleet Marine Force so that they will be strategically ready for immediate use, - such a transport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.

We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy sufficiently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a strength that will permit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean. It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated from the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some decentralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.

Another subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units that might be brought to the Atlantic - using Caribbean bases, primarily - Christobal, Guantanamo and others.

This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may prove to be of some use to you.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON. U.S.N.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

U.S.S. "Pennsylvania," c/o Postmaster,

San Francisco, California.

/s/ BETTY.

機密文書一五〇〇一 J - 一

提督 H . R . スターカより機密文書 J . O リチャードス  
に宛てし書簡。一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月二十日附

機密

ジョー君。君のワシントン行きは此處の今後の行動が不明の爲未決定のままになつて居る。當分の間艦隊は現在地にあるやう一時的決定が與へてあるが、此の決定は何時でも變へる事が出來るので。艦隊の行動は一つには備門艦隊がどうなるかといふ問題にかかるので。艦隊の行動は準備完了の状体で待機すべであるとしか申上げられぬ。今頃はもう私のこの前出した手紙を君が受取つて呉れた事であらう。此の手紙の中で私は君の質問に對する答として私の考を申上げた。即ち虹第4回によつて修正された虹考一の問題に備へるべく機動部隊を配置することに君の作戦力を集中するのが君の最終の途であると私は考へるといふ事だ。此の考へは未だに變化して



居ないのだ。

ニューヨーク、オルリアノスからの漂流船集団は最近パナマ運河通過を終へ當初の計画通り眞珠湾へ曳航の爲再組立中である。數日前此の計画實施の可否に關し討議した。若干検討を加へた後我々は船集曳航を繼續しホノルルに曳航する事を決定した。とにかくホノルル地区に部隊を常置しなければならずその都詮のために船集が當地に必要であるといふ理由によるのである。

グアノタナモは着しく擴張されつつある。灣の両端の飛行場に加ふるに六イノチ砲四門三イノチ對空砲四門を以て砲備を強化中である。遠からず我々は追加海兵約一〇五名及若干の日子を経て訓練終了せる時に約七五〇名の海上防備大隊を配備するつもりである。

私は又海兵隊の即時の使用に備へは巡洋二隻艦等に分めて居る。その一隻



底が君の役に立たん事を。  
御成功を祈る。

ベツテイ  
海

米國陸軍司令長官

米國海軍大將 J. O. リチャードソン 足下

カリフオルニア州サンフランシスコ

米國ペンシルヴニア州海軍長官

## EXHIBIT NO. 10

SECRET WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

FEB. 7, 1941

**Subject:** Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.**To:** The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured - forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

D. D. 1500-~~2~~<sup>J-2</sup>

EXHIBIT NO. 10

S E C R E T

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

/s/ Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.



D - D - 一五〇〇 - J - 2 (識別番號一〇)

秘密書類

一九四一年（昭和十六年）二月七日 在 ワシントン 陸軍省

主題 ハワイ真珠湾の防空について

参考先 海軍長官宛

一、真珠湾における警戒もしくは海軍根據地に對する急襲の可能性に關する一月二十四日附の實驗に終し予は本件の重要性と、かかる敵襲に感せんがためにあらゆる準備を行ふことの緊急性とについて貴官と全く同一意見なることをお答へしたい。ハワイ地區司令部は我が海外地區司令部の中で最もの設備をもつており経験を全面的に保護せんとする必要からその防衛計畫の完遂を優先的に行ひつゝある

二、ハワイ計畫案は攻撃機百四十八機の設置を定めてある

現在ハワイには三十六機の攻撃機がありこの中十九機はB-136型で十七機はやゝ低能率の機である。予は海軍省の請ひに應じB-136攻撃機三十一機をサンディエゴに集結し来る十日以内にハワイに出すた



めに目下手續き中である。その結果としてハワイにおける陸軍攻撃機群はビ-三六型五十機、やゝ低能率の機十七機になるであらう。なほ右の外機銃、防弾タンク、近代式兵器を装備した新型ビ-四〇、ビ-一攻撃機五十機をサン・ディゴに集結し三月十五日頃母艦によりハワイに海上出する豫定である。

三、現在ハワイ諸島には八十二門の三吋高角砲、二十門の三七ミリ高角砲二十門の三七ミリ高角砲（輸送中）、百九門の口徑五十ミリ高射機關銃がある。全計艦載としては九十八門の三吋高角砲百二十門の三七ミリ高角砲及び三百八門の口徑五十ミリ高射機關銃を必要としてゐる

四、防空哨戒任務に關連してその準備は既に命ぜられて居り六月中にはハワイに届けられるであらう。準備のための手續はすべてその裝備品が届けられる時までに作成を終へるであらう。開合せの結果必要な装備品の送付はそれより以前に行ふことは不可能なる事が判明した

五、ハワイ地区司令部總指揮官は艦艇及び根據地設備の防衛上阻塞氣球の採用と煙幕の使用の問題に對して直ちに考慮を拂うよう命令を受けてゐる。阻塞氣球の費費は現在のこところ不可能であり、一九四一年（昭和十六年）夏期までは利用できない。

六、在手持のものに三ヶあり、八十四ヶを製作中であるしこの中四十ヶは一九四一年（昭和十六年）六月三十日迄に陸部は九月迄に送付の認定である。現在収算金は二千九百五十ヶの氣球製作費を検討中である。オアフ島重要地域の適用の煙幕の價値は論議を要すべき問題である。信頼すべき說によればオアフ島の氣流及び地理的狀況は大規模の煙幕作戰田として煙幕の使用を不可能にさせることいふ。しかしながら總指揮官はこの問題を再度検討するであらう。

六、共同防衛のための貴下の他の申出に關し、予はハワイ地区總指揮官に對して貴下の書簡と本回答の寫を同附し、かかる處置を效果あらしめるよう地方海軍營局と協力することを命じつある。

（署名）ヘンリー・エル・スチムソン

海軍長官

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(17) 2 October 1941, Subject: Japanese-American Relations.  
(Excerpt)

I.B. 135

OCTOBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

• • • • •

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by the withdrawal of twenty-one Japanese divisions, 20 independent brigades, and 1,000 aircraft therefrom would be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a force if returned to Japan would be potentially of such an explosive nature that only a military oligarchy could control it. These militarists would submerge or destroy the moderate element in Japan replacing it with a restless Chauvinistic element possessing neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations with any of the Democratic Powers.

• • • • •

6. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep as much of the Japanese Army as possible pinned down in China. In other words we must cease at once our attempts to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and must give to China whatever aid is possible on our part in sustaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupy the bulk of the Japanese Army.

• • • • •

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

HAYES A. KRONER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-2.

Distribution:

The President

Chief of Staff

Secretary of State

Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.

Under Secretary of War

Director of Naval Intelligence

Assistant Secretary of War

Major General Embick

辯護側文書 一五〇〇一五—三

第七十九米國議會第一期

眞珠灣攻擊合同調查委員會書證第三十三號拔萃

書證 第三十三號

ワシントン陸軍省、G-1作製 軍事情報考算

(十七)一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月二日

題目・日米關係。(抜萃)

I・B 一三五 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月二日

參謀總長宛覺書

題目・日米關係

五、本課は、現日本内閣は支那より軍隊撤退の命令を實施し得るほど強力でない。但し米國の懲迫下に於てはその方向に傾く可能性はあると信ずる且實際問題として、我國作戰計畫實施の際階に於て、支那に於ける戰闘傳



止に續く日本側二十一箇聯團二十箇獨立旅團、航空機一千臺の撤退は米國の爲には極めて不利である。かかる軍隊が日本に歸還するときは恐らくは軍部による裏頭政治のみが統籌し得る、爆發的性格を帶ひたものとならう。之等軍國主義者は日本に於ける中庸分子を驅逐排除し之に替へるに如何なる民主主義國とも外交關係繼續可能能力も無く且又之を好まざる盲目的愛國主義的不穏分子を以てするであらう。

六、以上述べた事よりして、少くとも現在の所出来る限り多數の日本軍を支那に釘づけしておくことが必要と思はれる。

言換れば、我々は直ちに日本軍隊の支那撤退を實現せしむるが如き計畫を打切るべきであつて、更に又支那に對しては支那が日本の大軍を相手にし之を牽制することを繼續し得る武力及び意志を保持するに足る援助を我々の能ふ限りにおいて與へねばならないのである。

十一、此の情勢に現在の日本内閣が適應する事は先づあり得ないので我々の進むべき路は我々の直前に横はつて居る。

我方に於て益々軍事的經濟的脅迫を強化することを含めたり、強力なる對

日外交施策が、時を稼ぐ最善の機會であり太平洋領域に於ける争闘防止の最も良の方法であり更に結局三國條約を分裂せしめる最大の希望であると當課は信するものである。

今來函が益々強力なる「武力外交」を實行すべき事が明確に指摘されるのである。

參謀次長代理

陸軍大佐

G - 2

ヘイース・A・クローナー

配布先八

大統領。

國務長官。

陸軍次官。

陸軍副次官。

參謀總長。

參謀次長。

海軍情報部長。

エムビツク陸軍少將。

W  
P  
D

G e f D o n N O 1 5 0 0 - J - 3

(「眞珠灣攻撃」—第十四卷一三五七頁—一三五九頁)

Proceedings of Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark - Wednesday, January 2, 1946.

• • • • •

Mr. GESELL. You participated in the drafting and preparation of the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the President of November 27, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for it.

(5835) Mr. GESELL. Right.

Admiral STARK. That was formed up by the two war plans division.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular memorandum was written.

Admiral STARK. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was extremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood together on that. We had going out in December - and again the Army could give you perhaps more accurate information - but as I recall twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines. The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine Scouts were being trained.

I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in the Philippines for protecting Manila Bay, it was either June or July. At that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum sought to stress.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, what you were doing was stressing how much you could tolerate in the way of activity (5836) by Japan before you felt some action had to be taken by this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

• • • • •

(Page 2192, Part 5 - "Pearl Harbor Attack"



辯護側文書第一五〇〇一J-四號

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事錄

合衆國第七十九議會第一會期

ハロルド・アール・スターク提督の證言拔萃

一九四六年（昭和二十二年）一月一日（水曜日）

デニセル氏

貴官は貴官とマーシャル將軍の署名のある米大統領宛十一月二十七日附共同機書の起草及作成に參加したのでしたね。

スターク提督

さうですね。マーシャル將軍と私がその責任者でありました。

（五八三五）

デニセル氏　さうです。

スターク提督　それは兩軍事計劃部に依り作成されました。

デニセル氏　それはどう云ふ縦縄で書かれたのですか云つて下さい。その覺書なるものの書かれた理由の記述が尙少し不明瞭なのです。

D-2 D-041500J-4



►—5009T+000A x•d

卷之二

デ正セル氏

云い換れば貴官の爲して居たことと云ふのは日本の行動に對して貴官  
が我國は何か手を打たねばならぬと感じる様になるまで日本の活動をど  
こ迄堪え得られるかを力説して居たわけですね。（五八三六）

さうであります

（眞般滿攻艦 第五部 一一九二頁）

スマーラ提督

D. D. 1500-K-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
22 June 1940. (With enclosures)

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA  
Flagship

Lahaina Roads, T.H.  
22 June 1940

Dear Betty:

The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused me to send confidential despatch 220603.

To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A.A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 180 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

Two days later, the Army received word to "ease up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the "modified alert".

As a matter of interest, Herron said he had been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his figures) and further that no such storage space was available.

The Army "Alert" and action taken caused me some concern though I felt positive that any Army intelligence bearing on the above would be available to and evaluated by the Navy, with information to me. Of course, anything of this character tends to aggravate the tenseness of the situation and to interrupt training, as the Fleet is operating from Lahaina and Pearl by single ships and groups and without the full screening and scouting which a more serious situation would necessitate.

As a similar situation may again arise, I believe a remedy would be to insure that where possible, when joint action is involved, even in drills, that the Commanders of the Army and Navy be jointly informed,

D. D. 1500-K-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
22 June 1940. (With enclosures)

with definite information to me as to whether the alarm is  
real or simulated for purposes of training.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

D • D - 1500 - 111

一九四〇年六月二十二日付ジエー・オー・リーティードソン提督より  
エイチ・アル・スターク提督宛  
（別書同封）

旗艦合衆國軍艦ベンシルヴェニア號において

合衆國艦隊司令長官

一九四〇年六月二十二日

ハワイ・ラハイナ・ローヴにて



Def Doc No. 1500 K-1

ベッティ様

同封別書は説明の必要はありません。私はそれをみて機密公電第二  
二〇六〇三號を發することにした。

軍艦を明らかにするため、私は昨日眞珠灣に飛び、ハワイ地區司令部  
の指揮に任ずるアンドルウス氏、プロツク氏及びヘロン將軍と會談致し  
ました。約言すると、六月十七日陸軍省からの「警戒命令」によつて  
陸軍は高射砲臺その他を含む全要地に弾薬を補給し、さらにすべて重  
要地域と看做される地域即ちもたらゆる上陸海岸地、陸上施設（橋梁、  
道路等）および眞珠灣（陸戰隊）に對して哨戒と警備を施しました。

その指令に従事として通信はすべて暗號電報により參謀長宛に換ることと、ホノルルの民衆に刺激をあたへないようすること、從つて水道施設、発電所、ガス會社もしくは電話會社には軍隊は駐屯してゐないが、これら諸施設は自身で特別の注意を拂ふこと等が附記してある。海軍は海岸離航空哨戒を百八十哩から三百哩に増加し、その哨戒地域を擴大して一八〇度から三六〇度までを含むこととし、同時に三十哩の國內哨戒を行ふことにした。

二日後略宣は「警戒命令を緩和するよう」にただしそうべて重要地帯には半永久的に警戒を持續するよう命令を受けた。

これについては我々は全く知らなかつたのであるが、ヘロン將軍が會議の席上この警戒命令はいつまで續くかといふ私の質問に對する答辯の中では及されて初めて分つたのである。ヘロン將軍は「緩和せる警戒命令」に関する現在の彼の解釋を二十四日に更に緩和するかも知れぬと言つたのである。

興味をひいたことは、ヘロン氏は生ゴム及び錫を六十萬立方呎（他の

計画による一時勝し得るかどうかを尋ねられたことと次にそんな勝利の場所はないと言つたことである。

陸軍の「待機命令とその探つた行動は、たとへ上記に附せるある陸軍の情報は私にとつても情報であつたが海軍に利用されまた海軍によつて高く評価されることを強く感じてゐたけれどもある程の懸念を私にあたへた。もちろん艦隊は單獨または群団により、また事前の重大な場合に必要な完全隠蔽及び偵察もなしにラハイナと真珠湾から行動に出でるので、かかる性質の問題は事態を悪化させ訓練に支障をあたへる傾きがある。

再度同じ様な事態が發生するかも知れないから、私はその對策として協力行動の必要な時にはたとへ練習中でも、また可能な限り陸海軍の司令官に警報が眞實であるか練習目的のための假のものかどうかを共に知らすと共に小官にも明確な情報をあたへてほしいと信ずる 教員

(署名) ジエー。オー。リチャードソン

ワシントン。ディシー海軍省  
合衆國海軍提督 エイチ。アール。スターク殿

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(22) 2 November 1941, Subject: G-2 Estimate Far Eastern Situation.  
(Excerpt)

NOVEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.:

Subject: G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation. (For situation and communications maps see Tabs B, C, and D.)<sup>1</sup>

In compliance with verbal request, Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D., this date, the following is submitted as a G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation:

1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily overextended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure is crumbling.

2. For obvious reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the United States in a large scale war with Japan. While Japan is reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action.

1 Omitted

• • • •

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

(Page 1363, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

辯識側文書第 一五〇〇一 K-1 三號

「眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會」合衆國第七十九議會等  
會州「證據文書第 三十三號拔萃

證據文書第 三十三號

ワシントン市陸軍省 G-2 情報局二課調査の軍事謀報裁判所

(二二二) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月二日

題目 G-2(情報局二課)の極東状勢判断所(紛萃)

一九四一年十一月二日

ダヴリュー・ビー・デイーの參謀副長の爲の覺書

題目 G-2(情報局二課)の極東状勢判断所  
(状勢圖並に通信示圖に付 B.C.D の各圖参照)

ダヴリュー・ビー・デイーの參謀副長の口頭による頗る感心に感じ、下記  
の事項が G-2 の極東状勢判断所として本日提出される。  
中國に於ける四ヶ年の戰争の後、今や日本は軍事的にはアジア大陸



尼翁リに詠がり過ぎ、精神的には脆弱であり、心靈的障壁自體の  
構成構の固か否裏に氣づいてゐる。

判りもつた畠田からドイツ及中國使外に米國は一つの大馬鹿外財日  
本婦は引日給自己と妻親人である。

自家機械と取扱へることを懲りないがためにして、日本への敗退  
軍械試験試験行動を要求してゐる。

(後略)

G B 議院議員代議

米國議員代議

シエルマン・マイルズ

「眞珠湾攻撃」第十四巻第一四六三頁)

Proceedings of Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow - Wednesday, December 5, 1945.

• • • •

Mr. MITCHELL. . . .

I think it advisable at this time to mark as exhibit 44 this document which is entitled "Copies of Defense Plans" and contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans dealing directly with the question of defense against air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be filed as exhibit 44.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you a copy of this document before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you produced here the various plans on which this document, Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in (2639) the index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part of it?

General GEROW. I do not understand the question, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you checked these basic plans that have been produced here against the index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of Exhibit 44?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There are 13 items in the list of contents. Have you checked these documents against that index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are all the documents that are listed in this index present here? You have checked them, haven't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask you to look at them and just state generally, as you go over each item, what they are. The first is extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan - orange (1938); is that right?

General GEROW. This is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan - orange, 1938, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What does that mean?

General GEROW. That means it is a war plan that pertains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan was known as "orange."

Mr. MITCHELL. And item 2, extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan - Rainbow No. 1, what is that?

General GEROW. This document is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 1.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is Rainbow No. 1? Can you tell us what the relation of it is to the other plans, or something of that kind?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If I might refer to the document, I can give the scope of the plan, rather than from memory.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I want you to do.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not do the same thing with respect to the orange plan?

Mr. MITCHELL. Start with orange, and tell the committee, in general way, so we can orient these various plans and understand what they were and what their relations were to each other.

General GEROW. This joint Army and Navy basic war plan, orange, 1938, constitutes the basis upon which all Army plans, orange, and all Navy plans, orange, and all joint plans, orange, and all supporting allocations for an orange war shall be formulated and developed.

(2641) Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan. The document contains assumptions with regard to such a war, the concept of the war, the means assigned jointly to the Army and Navy and means assigned to each of the Army and Navy forces; joint decisions that were made by the Joint Board approving this plan; categories of defense.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that plan covered any sort of operations in that area in a war with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; limited to the Pacific area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Limited to the Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that, of course, included Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As part of the area?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, give us the same information about Rainbow No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date of Rainbow No. 1?

General GEROW. Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on August 14, by the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. August 14, what year?

General GEROW. 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the Acting Secretary of War. This document was prepared prior (2642) to my assignment to duty in the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that. I am asking you, as a War Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general way, what that plan dealt with, and what its relation was to orange, 1938.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The general situation on which this plan was based, was that at the time this directive was issued, the European war was in progress, which may involve other nations, and expand the field of military action.

There is an ever present possibility of the United States being drawn into this war. There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in which the United States will be forced to defend without allies the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest in the Pacific.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that plan cover operations in the Atlantic and Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does it assume a possible engagement with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I should like to read the reference to the special situation on which it was based, sir.

(2643) Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

General GEROW. Special situation for Rainbow No. 1 (reading):

The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

The purpose of the plan was "to provide for the most effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy objectives, particularly those in the territory and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude 13 degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U. S. armed forces to the American

Continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees south latitude, and to the United States possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will visualize the subsequent extension of United States control into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, consistent with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared at this time."

Mr. MITCHELL. Go to the third item in the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that (2644) and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?

General GEROW. This plan was approved on November 19, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. I think I can best describe this plan by reading from the plan the general assumptions on which it was based, and that is:

That the associated powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

- a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
- b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Indochina, and Thailand.

That the associated powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ADC-22.

That even if Japan, Indochina and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

That Latin American republics will take measures to (2645) control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere defense.

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War Department Operation Plan - Rainbow No. 5. What is that?

General GEROW. After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was prepared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan - Rainbow No. It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under which the war will be fought, the means of allotment of forces, the directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, the coordination that must be had with other departments of the Government.

Mr. MITCHELL. It includes in its scope the area of the Hawaiian Islands, does it?

General GEROW. It does; yes, sir.

(2646) Mr. MITCHELL. Did you give the date of that?

General GEROW. This document does not contain on it the date of approval, but I am sure it was in August 1941, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief of Staff, August 1941."

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I think I have that somewhere in my documents.

Mr. MITCHELL. Never mind. That is near enough.

General GEROW. I know it was sent out to Hawaii in August 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us the scope and nature of that document, and the date?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan which I have just discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. A plan worked out by the local commanders in 1940?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department?

(2647) General GEROW. By the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District.

General GEROW. No, sir; this is not a joint plan. This is an Army plan. It is a little different from a plan, sir. It is what we call a defense project.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

General GEROW. It contains the objective to be accomplished, but is primarily directed toward setting up the means that are required to carry out that war mission in considerable detail.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in August 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates.

General GEROW. This defense project is prepared annually and revised annually. This is the 1940 edition. The 1941 edition had not been completed at that time, but the orange plan of 1938 and the rainbow plan No. 1, contained the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans were taken together with the other data with which to revise the defense project which was in existence at that time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is joint coastal frontier (2648) defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

General GEROW. This is a joint plan that is prepared by the local commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based on the joint plans, Army and Navy plans furnished by the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the date of it?

General GEROW. This document was approved at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April 1941, and Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, 11th of April 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will state that that document is in Exhibit 4, set forth in full, not a mere extract of it. The whole thing is in this exhibit 44.

The next item is No. 7, annex No. VII, to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that, and what is it?

General GEROW. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is annex No. VII to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that document, the nature of it, and the date of it?

General GEROW. Annex No. VII, sir; to that document is a local plan prepared by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. It is dated the 28th of March 1941, and covers joint security measures, protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

(2649) Mr. MITCHELL. The next item in the same volume, No. 8, is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement). What exhibit is that?

Mr. GESELL. Forty-four.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever see the report dated August 20, 1941, titled "A Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii"?

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that, please?

Mr. MITCHELL. August 20, 1941.

It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C., through Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, H., which has heretofore been marked Exhibit 13. Did you ever see that report?

General GEROW. I cannot recall at this time as having ever seen that report, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the report which considered the vulnerability of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it would likely come, in the morning, from carriers, and things of that kind, and then went on to estimate the ways of defeating it, and the number of planes that would be required to run a 360° long-range reconnaissance to detect the Jap carriers the evening before.

General GEROW. I have read the document since, just prior to this investigation.

(2650) Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't see it at the time?

General GEROW. At the time I don't recall having seen it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 9, the next item in the index, "5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department."

Will you look at that and tell us what it is?

General GEROW. That document, sir, is contained in the operation orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir. It is, as stated, a standing operating procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. Promulgated by whom?

General GEROW. By the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. On his own, not a direction from Washington?

General GEROW. No, sir; on his own.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the document in which General Short directed his air alerts 1,2,3, or am I wrong about that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they are included in this document.

Mr. MITCHELL. Alert 1, sabotage without threat from without, id se c?

GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see that document before December 7, 1941?

General GEROW. I don't recall ever having seen it before (2651) December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 10th item is "Field Order No. 1," and 11, Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan"; 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41."

Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can describe them more fully, but just to complete the story here will you look at them and tell us in a general way what the nature of them is?

General GEROW. That is number 10, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. 10, 11 and 12. Ten is the first, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department." Give the date of it and, if you can from inspection, the general nature of it.

General GEROW. No. 10, sir, "Field Order No. 1 (Naval Security)," an Army document.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. And it is the operations order as written out by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.

has no date. It is intended as an order to be put into effect when the emergency arrives.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is No. 11? 11, 12, and 13, they are Navy documents?

General GEROW. No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as (2652) this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. MITCHELL. It would be a corresponding document to the Army operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

What is the date of that?

General GEROW. That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. By whom is that issued or authorized?

General GEROW. The heading shows that it is issued by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District."

What is the date of that and by whom issued or authorized?

General GEROW. That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor.

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(Pages 1001 + 1007, Part 3 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護文書第一五〇〇—K—四

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事録——合衆國

第七十九議會 第一期

レナード。T。デエロー中將ノ證言ヨリノ抜萃——一九四五年

(昭和二十年)十二月五日

ミツチエル氏。

私ハ、防衛計畫案寫シト題シ空襲ニ對スル防禦ノ問題ヲ直接ニ取扱ツ  
タ種々ノ基礎的陸海軍計畫案ヨリノ抜萃ヲ含ンデキルコノ書類ヲ書證第  
四四號トスル事ガ此際當ラ得テキルト思ヒマス。

議長。デハ書證第四四號トシテ総チ込マセル事ニシマセウ。

（右關係書類ハ書證第四四號トサレタ。）

ミツチエル氏。貴下ノ前ニコノ書類ノ寫シガアリマスカ。

デエロー中將。ハイ、アリマス。



ミツチエル氏。 貴下ハコノ書類即チ書證第四四號ノ基礎トナツテキル種々ノ計量即チ十三項目トシテ索引ニ記サレタルモノ即チソレノ陸軍省關係ノ部分ヘニ六三九ヲ茲ニ提出サレマシタカ。

デエロー中將。 貴下ノ質問ガ了解出來マゼン。

ミツチエル氏。 貴下ハ茲ニ提出サレタ之等ノ基礎的計量案ヲ索引ト照ラレ合ハサレマシタカ。

デエロー中將。 ハイ、イタシマシタ。

ミツチエル氏。 書證第四四號ノデスカ。

デエロー中將。 サウデス。

ミツチエル氏。 内容ノ表中ニ十三項目アリマス。

貴下ハアノ索引ト、之等ノ書類ヲ照合サレマシタカ。

デエロー中將。 ハイ、致シマシタ。

ミツチエル氏。 コノ索引記録サレテキル書類全部ガ茲ニアリマスカ。

貴下ハ目ヲ通サレタノデスネ。

デエロー中將。 ハイ。

ミツチエル氏。私ハ、貴下ガソレゾレノ項目ヲ逐次調べナガラ、ソレガ如何ナルモノデアルカヲ概括的ニザツト述べテ頂キ度イト思ヒマス。第一ハ陸海軍共同基礎戦争計画一オレンヂ（一九三八年）デスガ之デ間違ヒアリマセンカ。

デエロー中將。コレハ陸海軍共同基礎戦争計画案デ一九三八年度（昭和十三年）オレンヂデアリマス。

ミツチエル氏。ソレハドウイフ意味テスカ。

デエロー中將。ソレハ特ニ日本ニ對スル作戦ニ關スル戦争計画デアル事ヲ意味シマス。日本ハ「オレンヂ」トシテ知ラレテキマシタ。

ミツチエル氏。第二ノ項目、陸海軍共同基礎戦争計画案ヨリノ抜萃レインボウ第一號デス。

ミツチエル氏。レインボウ、第一號トハ何デスカ。之ト他ノ計画案又ハサウイフ種類ノモノト如何ナル關係ガアルカ述ベラルコトガデキマスカ。

デエロー中將。ハイ、若シ書類ヲ引用シテ宜シケレバ記憶カラヨリモ良ク計画ノ範囲ヲ説明スル事ガ出來マス。

ミツチエル氏。ソレハ私ノ望ム所デス。  
キーフ氏。何故オレンヂ案ニ關シテモ同様ノ方法ヲトランイノデスカ  
ミツチエル氏。テハ、オレンヂカラ始メ我々ガ之等ノ種々ノ計畫案ノ概念  
ヲ得、ソレ等ガ何デアツタカ又ソレラノ相互的關係ハドンナモノデア  
ツタカラ了解スル事ガ出來ル様ニ委員會ニ對シ概括的ニ説明シテ下サ  
イ。

ザエロー中將。ノノ陸海軍共同基盤戰爭計畫案即チ一九三八年度オレンヂ  
ハ全陸軍計畫、オレンヂ、全海軍計畫、オレンヂ、全共同計畫、オレ  
ンデ及ビオレンヂ戰爭ニ對スル全豫備的配置等ガ具体化サレ更ニ敷衍  
サルベキソノ基盤構成シテ居リマス。

基礎

（文書）

ハ二六四一、オレンヂトハ私ノ申上グマシタ通り日本ヲ指ス暗號デアリマス。  
其文書ハ斯ノ如キ戦争ニ關スル仮想戦争ノ概念、陸海兩軍ニ課セフレタル方策  
並ニ陸軍及海軍各個ニ課セラレタル方策、更ニ又共同委員會ガ本案ヲ承認シ  
テ作り上ダク共同決議、防衛ノ種類ヲ含ンデ居リマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソレデハ其ノ計畫案ハ日本トノ戦争ノ場合ソノ地域内デノド  
ンナ作戦ニモ亘ツテ居タトイフンデスカ

デエロー陸軍大將 ソウデス。太平洋地區ニ限ラレテ居リマシタ。

ミツチエル氏 太平洋ニ限ラレテ居タンデスカ

デエロー大將 ソウデアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソレデハ勿論布哇モ含マレテ居タトイフ譯デスカ

デエロー大將 ソウデアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソノ地域ノ一部トシテ？

デエロー大將 ソウデアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 デハ第二ノ項目、即チレーンボウ第一時ニ就ケ同様話シテ下